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ABSTRACT
We examine the evidence on excess stock return predictability in a Bayesian setting in which the investor
faces uncertainty about both the existence and strength of predictability. When we apply our methods
to the dividend-price ratio, we find that even investors who are quite skeptical about the existence
of predictability sharply modify their views in favor of predictability when confronted by the historical
time series of returns and predictor variables. Correctly taking into account the stochastic properties
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In this study, we evaluate the evidence in favor of excess stock return predictability from
the perspective of a Bayesian investor. We focus on the case of a single predictor variable
to highlight the complex statistical issues that come into play in this deceptively simple
problem.
The investor in our model considers the evidence in favor of the following linear model
for excess returns:
rt+1 =  + xt + ut+1; (1)
where rt+1 denotes the return on a broad stock index in excess of the riskfree rate, xt denotes
a predictor variable, and ut+1 the unpredictable component of the return. The investor also
places a nite probability on the following model:
rt+1 =  + ut+1: (2)
Namely, the investor assigns a prior probability q to the state of the world in which returns
are predictable (because the prior on  will be smooth, the chance of  = 0 in (1) is
innitesimal), and a probability 1 q to the state of the world in which returns are completely
unpredictable. In both cases, the parameters are unknown. Thus our model allows for both
parameter uncertainty and \model uncertainty".1
Allowing for a non-zero probability on (2) is one way in which we depart from previous
studies. Previous Bayesian studies of return predictability allow for uncertainty in the pa-
rameters in (1), but assume at priors (see Barberis (2000), Brandt, Goyal, Santa-Clara,
and Stroud (2005), Johannes, Polson, and Stroud (2002), Skoulakis (2007) and Stambaugh
(1999)). As Wachter (2010) shows, at or nearly-at priors imply a degree of predictability
that is hard to justify economically. Other studies (Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), Pastor
and Stambaugh (2009), Shanken and Tamayo (2011), Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009))
1However, note that our investor is Bayesian, rather than ambiguity averse (e.g. Chen and Epstein
(2002)).Our priors are equivalent to placing a point mass on  = 0 in (1).
3investigate the impact of economically informed prior beliefs. These studies nonetheless as-
sume that the investor places a probability of one on the predictability of returns. However,
an investor who thinks that (2) represents a compelling null hypothesis will have a prior that
places some weight on the possibility that returns are not predictable at all.
Our work also relates to the Bayesian model selection methods of Avramov (2002) and
Cremers (2002). In these studies, the investor has a prior probability over the full set of
possible linear models that make use of a given set of predictor variables. Thus the setting
of these papers is more complex than ours in that many predictor variables are considered.
However, these papers also make the assumption that the predictor variables are either non-
stochastic, or that their shocks are uncorrelated with shocks to returns. These assumptions
are frequently satised in a standard ordinary least squares regression, but rarely satised
in a predictive regression. In contrast, we are able to formulate and solve the Bayesian
investor's problem when the regressor is stochastic and correlated with returns.
When we apply our methods to the dividend-price ratio, we nd that an investor who
believes that there is a 50% probability of predictability prior to seeing the data updates to
a 86% posterior probability after viewing quarterly postwar data. We nd average certainty
equivalent returns of 1% per year for an investor whose prior probability in favor of pre-
dictability is just 20%. For an investor who believes that there is a 50/50 chance of return
predictability, certainty equivalent returns are 1.72%.
We also empirically evaluate the eect of correctly incorporating the initial observation of
the dividend-price ratio into the likelihood (the exact likelihood approach) versus the more
common conditional likelihood approach. In the conditional likelihood approach, the initial
observation of the predictor variable is treated as a known parameter rather than as a draw
from the data generating process. We nd that the the unconditional risk premium is poorly
estimated when we condition on the rst observation. However, when this is treated as a draw
from the data generating process, the expected return is estimated reliably. Surprisingly, the
posterior mean of the unconditional risk premium diers from the sample average.
Finally, when we examine the evolution of posterior beliefs over the postwar period, we
4nd substantial dierences between the beliefs implied by our approach, which treats the
regressor as stochastic and realistically captures the relation between the regressor and re-
turns, and beliefs implied by assuming non-stochastic regressors. In particular, our approach
implies that the belief in the predictability of returns rises dramatically over the 2000-2005
period while approaches assuming xed regressors imply a decline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our statistical
method and contrasts it with alternative approaches. Section 3 describes our empirical
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Statistical Method
2.1 Data generating processes
Let rt+1 denote continuously compounded excess returns on a stock index from time t to
t+1 and xt the value of a (scalar) predictor variable. We assume that this predictor variable
follows the process
xt+1 =  + xt + vt+1: (3)
Stock returns can be predictable, in which case they follow the process (1) or unpredictable,
in which case they follow the process (2). In either case, errors are serially uncorrelated,

















As we show below, the correlation between innovations to returns and innovations to the
predictor variable implies that (3) aects inference about returns, even when there is no
predictability.
5When the process (3) is stationary, i.e.  is between -1 and 1, the predictor variable has











1   2: (7)
These follow from taking unconditional means and variances on either side of (3). Note
that these are population values conditional on knowing the parameters. Given these, the










The investor faces uncertainty both about the model (i.e. whether returns are predictable
or not), and about the parameters of the model. We represent this uncertainty through a
hierarchical prior. There is a probability q, that investors face the distribution given by (1),
(3) and (4). We denote this state of the world H1. There is a probability 1 q that investors
face the distribution given by (2), (3) and (4). We denote this state of the world H0. As we
will show, the stochastic properties of x have relevance in both cases.
The prior information on the parameters is conditional on Hi. Let
b0 = [; ; ]
>
and
b1 = [; ; ;]
>:
Note that p(b1;jH1) can also be written as p(;b0;jH1).2 We set the prior on b0 and 
so that
p(b0;jH0) = p(b0;jH1) = p(b0;):
2Formally we could write down p(b1;jH0) by assuming p(jb0;;H0) is a point mass at zero.
6We assume the investor has uninformative beliefs on these parameters. We follow the ap-
proach of Stambaugh (1999) and Zellner (1996), and derive a limiting Jereys prior as




for  2 ( 1;1), and zero otherwise.
The parameter that distinguishes H0 from H1 is . One approach would be to write down
a prior distribution for  unconditional on the remaining parameters. However, it is dicult
to think about priors on  in isolation from beliefs about other parameters. For example, a
high variance of xt might lower one's prior on , while a large residual variance of rt might
raise it. Rather than placing a prior on  directly, we follow Wachter and Warusawitharana
(2009) and place a prior on the population R2. To implement this prior on the R2, we place





















Equation (10) provides a mapping between a prior distribution on  and a prior distribution
on the population R2. Given an  draw, an R2 draw can be computed using (10).








7Because x is a function of  and v, the prior on  is also implicitly a function of these
parameters. The parameter  indexes the degree to which the prior is informative. As
 ! 1, the prior over  becomes uninformative; all values of  are viewed as equally
likely. As  ! 0, the prior converges to p(b0;) multiplied by a point mass at 0, implying





























Jereys invariance theory provides an independent justication for modeling priors on 






This prior corresponds to the limit of (12) as  approaches innity. Modeling the prior for
 as depending on x not only has a convenient interpretation in terms of the distribution
of the R2, but also implies that an innite prior variance represents ignorance as dened
by Jereys (1961). Note that a prior on  that is independent of x would not have this
property.
Figure 1 shows the resulting distribution for the population R2 for various values of .
Panel A shows the distribution conditional on H1 while Panel B shows the unconditional
distribution. More precisely, for any value k, Panel A shows the prior probability that the
R2 exceeds k, conditional on the existence of predictability. For large values of , e.g. 100,
the prior probability that the R2 exceeds k across the relevant range of values for the R2 is
close to one. The lower the value of , the less variability in  around its mean of zero,
and the lower the probability that the R2 exceeds k for any value of k. Panel B shows the
unconditional probability that the R2 exceeds k for any value of k, assuming that the prior
probability of predictability, q, is equal to 0.5. By the denition of conditional probability:
p(R
2 > k) = p(R
2 > kjH1)q:
8Therefore Panel B takes the values in Panel A and scales them down by 0.5.
2.3 Likelihood
2.3.1 Likelihood under H1
Under H1, returns and the predictor variable follow the joint process given in (1) and (3).
It is convenient to group observations on returns and contemporaneous observations on the
state variable into a matrix Y and lagged observations on the state variable and the constant

























z = vec(Y )
Z1 = I2 
 X:
In the above, the vec operator stacks the elements of the matrix columnwise. It follows that


















The likelihood function (14) conditions on the rst observation of the predictor variable,
x0. Stambaugh (1999) argues for treating x0 and x1;:::;xT symmetrically: as random
draws from the data generating process. If the process for xt is stationary and has run for a
substantial period of time, then results in Hamilton (1994, p. 265) imply that x0 is a draw
from a multivariate normal distribution with mean x and standard deviation x. Combining





























Following Box and Tiao (1973), we refer to (14) as the conditional likelihood and (15) as the
exact likelihood.
2.3.2 Likelihood under H0

























The conditional likelihood takes the same form as in the seemingly unrelated regression
model (see Ando and Zellner (2010)). Using similar reasoning as in the H1 case, the exact




























As above, we refer to (16) as the conditional likelihood and (17) as the exact likelihood.
2.4 Posterior distribution
The investor updates his prior beliefs to form the posterior distribution upon seeing the
data. As we discuss below, this posterior requires the computation of two quantities: the
posterior of the parameters conditional on the absence or presence of return predictability,
10and the posterior probability that returns are predictable. Given these two quantities, we
can simulate from the posterior distribution.
To compute the posteriors, we apply Bayes' rule conditional on the model:
p(bi;jHi;D) / p(Djbi;;Hi)p(bi;jHi); i = 0;1: (18)
Because x is a nonlinear function of the underlying parameters, the posterior distributions
conditional on H0 and H1 are nonstandard and must by computed numerically. We can sam-
ple from these distributions quickly and accurately using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
(see Chib and Greenberg (1995), Johannes and Polson (2006)). See Appendix B for details.
Let  q denote the posterior probability that excess returns are predictable. By denition,
 q = p(H1jD):
It follows from Bayes' rule, that
 q =
B10q







is the Bayes factor for the alternative hypothesis of predictability against the null of no
predictability. The Bayes factor is a likelihood ratio in that it is the likelihood of return
predictability divided by the likelihood of no predictability. However, it diers from the
standard likelihood ratio in that the likelihoods p(DjHi) are not conditional on the values
of the parameters. These likelihoods are given by
p(DjHi) =
Z
p(Djbi;;Hi)p(bi;jHi)dbi d; i = 0;1: (21)
To form these likelihoods, the likelihoods conditional on parameters (the likelihood functions
generally used in classical statistics) are integrated over the prior distribution of the param-
eters. Under our distributions, these integrals cannot be computed analytically. However,
the Bayes factor (20) can be computed directly using the generalized Savage-Dickey ratio
(Dickey (1971), Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995)). Details can be found in Appendix C.
11Putting these two pieces together, we draw from the posterior parameter distribution
by drawing from p(b1;jD;H1) with probability  q and from p(b0;jD;H0) with probability
1    q.
2.5 An alternative: Non-stochastic regressors
An alternative approach to inference is to adopt the standard assumptions of ordinary least
squares regression, namely that the regressors xt are xed, or that us and vt are uncorrelated
for all s and t. For example, consider the priors and likelihood proposed by Fernandez, Ley,



























The specication is completed by setting p() / 1. These assumptions on the prior are








































The expressions for the prior and likelihood under H0 are analogous. Similar specications
are employed by Chipman, George, and McCulloch (2001), Cremers (2002), Stock and Wat-
son (2011) and Wright (2008). This formulation is closely related to the conjugate prior
described in Zellner (1996). Like Zellner's prior, it leads to analytical expressions for the
posterior distribution and Bayes factor.
12The above specication diers from ours in two ways. First, the prior beliefs condition
on observations on xt. Second, and more fundamentally, the likelihood function conditions
on xt, namely, it treats it as known. The two are related, in that both assumptions are most
reasonable in cases where xt is known at time zero, or where all correlations between ut and




where the terms in the product are given by the normal density. However, the true conditional








Under the assumption that ut and vt are uncorrelated in the prior, the second term will
not depend on ,  and u, and thus it \drops out" when multiplied by the prior to form
the posterior in Bayes rule (18).4 However, requiring these shocks to be uncorrelated is not
realistic. For this reason, is it not generally valid to drop the second term in (27).
Perhaps there is some other way to justify the use of (24) rather than the full likelihood.
Consider, for example, the following tempting (but wrong) argument. For convenience,
dene the notation Dr = fr1;:::;rTg and Dx = fx0;x1;:::;xTg. The marginal likelihood
for returns (24) is valid regardless of the assumption on the correlation between ut and vt.
Could one form a marginal posterior, p(;;ujDr)? One way to do this might be to consider
p(;;ujDr) / p(Drj;;u)p(;;u):
However, p(;;ujDr) is not the same as (24), which uses information on x as well as r.
3Note that this expression still omits the likelihood for the initial observation x0.
4More precisely, it becomes part of the constant term.
13Another tempting but incorrect argument is to form the posterior
p(;;ujDr;Dx) / p(Drj;;u;Dx)p(;;u);
which represents valid inference under the assumption p(;;u) = p(;;ujDx). Again,






Instead of just computing rt+1 knowing xt, p(rt+1jxt;;;u;Dx) requires one to computes
the likelihood of each observation rt+1 knowing the full time series of x. Because of the
correlation between u and v, future shocks to x convey additional information about returns.
While technically speaking this approach is valid, it makes very little economic sense (why
would x be observed before r?) and in any case is not implemented in any of the studies
cited above.
Because xt appears in the likelihood function, it cannot be simply ignored. Nor can it
be treated as known. The only alternative is to assume that it is stochastic, as we have
done. At the root of the problem is the fact that the similarity between the likelihood in
the linear regression model in the time series setting and under OLS is only apparent. In a
time series setting, it is not valid to condition on the entire time path of the \independent"
variable. The dierences ultimately come down to the interpretation of the shock ut. In a
standard OLS setting, ut is an error, and is thus correlated with the independent variable
at all leads and lags. In a time series setting, it is not an error, but rather a shock, and this
independence does not hold.
3 Results
3.1 Data
We use data from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). We compute excess
stock returns by subtracting the continuously compounded 3-month Treasury bill return
14from the return on the value-weighted CRSP index at a quarterly frequency. Following a
large empirical literature on return predictability, we focus on the dividend-price ratio as
the regressor because the present-value relation between prices and returns suggests that it
should capture variables that predict stock returns. The dividend-price ratio is computed by
dividing the dividend payout over the previous 12 months with the current price of the stock
index. The use of 12 months of data accounts for seasonalities in dividend payments. We
use the logarithm of the dividend-price ratio as the predictor variable. Data are quarterly
from 1952 to 2009.
3.2 Bayes factors and posterior means
Table 1 reports Bayes factors for various choices on the prior distribution. Four values of 
are considered: 0.051, 0.087, 0.148 and 100. These translate into values of P(R2 > :01jH1)
(the prior probability that the R2 exceeds 0.01) equal to 0.05, 0.25, 0.50 and 0.99 respectively.
These R2s should be interpreted in terms of regressions performed at a quarterly frequency.
Bayes factors are reported for the exact likelihood, and, to evaluate the importance of in-
cluding the initial term, the conditional likelihood as well.
Table 1 shows that the Bayes factor is hump-shaped in P(R2 > 0:01jH1). For small
values, the Bayes factor is close to one. For large values, the Bayes factor is close to zero.
Both results can be understood using the formula for the Bayes factor in (20) and for the
likelihoods p(DjHi) in (21). For low values of this probability, the investor imposes a very
tight prior on the R2. Therefore the hypotheses that returns are predictable and that returns
are unpredictable are nearly the same. It follows from (21) that the likelihoods of the data
under these two scenarios are nearly the same and that the Bayes factor is nearly one. This
is intuitive: when two hypotheses are close, a great deal of data are required to distinguish
one from the other.
The fact that the Bayes factor approaches zero as P(R2 >;01jH1) increases is less in-
tuitive. The reduction in Bayes factors implies that, as the investor allows a greater range
15of values for the R2, the posterior probability that returns are predictable approaches zero.
This eect is known as Bartlett's paradox, and was rst noted by Bartlett (1957) in the
context of distinguishing between uniform distributions. As Kass and Raftery (1995) dis-
cuss, Bartlett's paradox makes it crucial to formulate an informative prior on the parameters
that dier between H0 and H1. The mathematics leading to Bartlett's paradox are most
easily seen in a case where Bayes factors can be computed in closed form. However, we can
obtain an understanding of the paradox based on the form of the likelihoods p(DjH1) and
P(DjH0). These likelihoods involve integrating out the parameters using the prior distribu-
tion. If the prior distribution on  is highly uninformative, the prior places a large amount
of mass in extreme regions of the parameter space. In these regions, the likelihood of the
data conditional on the parameters will be quite small. At the same time, the prior places a
relatively small amount of mass in the regions of the parameter space where the likelihood
of the data is large. Therefore P(DjH1) (the integral of the likelihood under H1) is small
relative to P(DjH0) (the integral of the likelihood under H0).
Table 1 also shows that there are substantial dierences between the Bayes factors result-
ing from the exact versus the conditional likelihood.5 The Bayes factors resulting from the
exact likelihood are larger than those resulting from the conditional likelihood, thus implying
a greater posterior probability of return predictability. This dierence reects the fact that
the posterior mean of , conditional on H1, is higher for the exact likelihood than for the
conditional likelihood, and the posterior mean is  is lower.6
We can use the connection between the posterior means and the Bayes factor to under-
5We are not the rst to note the importance of the rst observation. See, for example, Poirier (1978).
6The source of this negative relation is the negative correlation between shocks to returns and shocks to
the predictor variable. Suppose that a draw of  is below its value predicted by ordinary least squares (OLS).
This implies that the OLS value for  is \too high", i.e. in the sample shocks to the predictor variable are
followed by shocks to returns of the same sign. Therefore shocks to the predictor variable tend to be followed
by shocks to the predictor variable that are of dierent signs. Thus the OLS value for  is \too low". This
explains why values of the posterior mean of  are higher for low values of P(R2 > 0:01jH1) (and hence low
values of the posterior mean of ) than for high values, and higher than the ordinary least squares estimate.
16stand why the Bayes factor changes with the specication. Using the exact likelihood leads
to lower posterior values of . This is because the exact likelihood leads to more precise
estimates of x, and therefore lower estimates of x. Because the posterior mean of  is
lower, the posterior mean of  is higher, and the Bayes factor is higher.
3.3 The long-run equity premium
For the predictability model, the expected excess return on stocks (the equity premium)
varies over time. In the long run, however, the current value of xt becomes irrelevant. Under
our assumptions xt is stationary with mean x, and therefore rt is also stationary with mean
r = E[ + xt + ut+1jb1;] =  + x:
As is the case with x, this is a population value that conditions on the value of the pa-
rameters. For the no-predictability model, r is simply equal to . We can think of r as
the average equity premium; the fact that it is \too high" constitutes the equity premium
puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)), and it is often computed by simply taking the sample
average of excess returns.
The posterior expectation of r under various specications is shown in the fth column
of Table 1. Because dierences in the expected return arise from dierences in the posterior
mean of the predictor variable x, the table also reports the posterior mean of x. The dier-
ences in the long-run equity premium are striking. The sample average of the (continuously
compounded) excess return on stocks over this period is 4.49%. However, assuming the
exact likelihood implies produces a range for this excess return between 3.45% and 3.90%
depending on the strength of the prior. Why is the equity premium in these cases as much
as a full percentage point lower?
To answer this question, it is helpful to look at the posterior means of the predictor
variable, reported in the next column of Table 1. For the exact likelihood specication, the
posterior mean of the log dividend yield ranges from -3.25 to -3.40. The sample mean is -3.54.
It follows that the shocks vt over the sample period must be negative on average. Because of
17the negative correlation between shocks to the dividend price ratio and to expected returns,
the shocks ut must be positive on average. Therefore the posterior mean lies below the
sample mean.
Continuing with the exact likelihood case, the posterior mean of x is highest (and
hence furthest from the sample mean) in the no-predictability model, and becomes lower
as the prior becomes less dogmatic. Excess returns follow this pattern in reverse, namely
they are lowest (and furthest from the sample mean) for the no-predictability model and
highest for the predictability model with the least dogmatic prior. This eect may arise
from the persistence . The more dogmatic the prior, the closer the posterior mean of the
persistence is to one. The more persistent the process, the more likely the positive shocks
are to accumulate, and the more the sample mean is likely to deviate from the true posterior
mean.
The results are very dierent when the conditional likelihood is used, as shown in Panel B.
For the no-predictability model, r =  is equal to the sample mean. However, as long as
there is some predictability, estimation of r depends on x, which is unstable due to the
presence of 1  in the denominator. It is striking that, in contrast to our main specication,
the conditional likelihood specication has great dicultly in pinning down the mean of
expected excess stock returns.
3.4 The posterior distribution
We now examine the posterior probability that excess returns are predictable. For conve-
nience, we present results for our main specication that uses the exact likelihood. As a rst
step, we examine the posterior distribution for the R2.
The posterior distribution of the R2
Figure 2 shows two plots on the prior and posterior distribution of the R2 with priors
P(R2 > 1%jH1) = 0:50 and q = 0:5. Panel A plots P(R2 > k) as a function of k for both
18the prior and the posterior; this corresponds to 1 minus the cumulative density function of
the R2.7 The plot for the P(R2 > k) demonstrates a rightward shift for the posterior for
values of k below (roughly) 2%.
The strength of the predictability can be seen in that while the prior implies P(R2 >
1%) = 0:25, the posterior implies P(R2 > 1%) close to 0.50. Thus, after observing the data,
an investor revises his beliefs on the strength of predictability substantially upward. Panel
B plots the probability density function of the R2. The prior places the highest density on
low values of the R2. The posterior however places high density in the region around 2%
and has lower density than the prior for R2 values close to zero. The evidence in favor of
predictability, with a moderate R2, is sucient to overcome the investor's initial skepticism.
The posterior probability of return predictability
Figure 2 shows the posterior R2 for a given set of prior beliefs. Table 2 shows how various
statistics on the posterior distribution vary as the prior distribution changes. Table 2 presents
the posterior probabilities of predictability as a function of the investor's prior about the
existence of predictability, q, and the prior belief on the strength of predictability. The
posterior probability is increasing in q and hump-shaped in the strength of the prior, reecting
the fact that the Bayes factors are hump-shaped in the strength of the prior. The results
demonstrate that investors with moderate beliefs on both the existence and strength of
predictability revise their beliefs on the existence on predictability sharply upward. For
example, an investor with q = 0:5 and P(R2 > :01jH1) = 0:50 conclude that the posterior
likelihood of predictability equals 0.86. This result is robust to a wide range of choices for
P(R2 > :01jH1). As the table shows, P(R2 > :01jH1) = 0:25 implies a posterior probability
of 0.87. The posterior probability falls o dramatically as P(R2 > :01jH1) approaches
one; for these very diuse priors (which imply what might be considered an economically
unreasonable amount of predictability), the Bayes factors are close to zero. Table 2 also
7This gures shows the unconditional posterior probability that the R2 exceeds k; that is, it does not
condition on the existence of predictability.
19shows reasonably high means of the  and the R2, except for the diuse prior.
The above analysis evaluates the statistical evidence on predictability. The Bayesian
approach also enables us to study the economic gains from market timing. In particular,
we can evaluate the certainty equivalent loss from failing to time the market under dierent
priors on the existence and strength of predictability.
Certainty equivalent returns
We now measure the economic signicance of the predictability evidence using certainty











for  = 5, where WT+1 = WT(wexpfrT+1 + rf;Tg + (1   w)expfrf;Tg), and w is the weight
on the risky asset. The expectation is taken with respect to the predictive distribution





for i = 0;1.
A draw rT+1 from the distribution p(rT+1 jxT;b1;) is given by (1) with probability  q
and (2) with probability 1    q. The posterior distribution of the parameters is described in
Section 2.4.











Following Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), we measure utility loss as the dierence between
certainty equivalent returns from following the optimal strategy and from following a sub-
optimal strategy. We dene the sub-optimal strategy as the strategy that the investor would
20follow if he believes that there is no predictability. Note, however, that the expectation in
(28) is computed with respect to the same distribution for both the optimal and sub-optimal
strategy.
Panel D of Table 2 shows the dierence in certainty equivalent returns as described above.
These dierences are averaged over the posterior distribution for x to create a dierence that
is not conditional on any specic value. The data indicate economically meaningful economic
losses from failing to time the market. Panel D shows that, for example, an investor with a
prior on  such that P(R2 > :01jH1) = 0:50 and a 50% prior belief in the existence of return
predictability would suer a certainty equivalent loss of 1:72% (in annual terms) from failing
to time the market. Higher values of q imply greater certainty equivalent losses.
3.5 Evolution of the posterior distribution over time
We next describe the evolution of the posterior distribution over time. This distribution
exhibits surprising behavior over the 2000-2005 period. This behavior is a direct result of
the stochastic properties of the predictor variable xt.
Starting in 1972, we compute the posterior distribution conditional on having observed
data up to and including that year. We start in 1972 because this allows for twenty years
of data for the rst observation. The posterior is computed by simulating 500,000 draws
and dropping the rst 100,000. To save on computation time, we update the posterior every
year. For reference, Figure 3 shows the time-series of the log dividend-price ratio. As we
will see, much of the behavior of the posterior distribution can be understood based on the
time series of this ratio.
Figure 4 shows the posterior probability of predictability ( q) in Panel A (assuming a
prior probability of 0.5). The solid line corresponds to our benchmark specication. This
line is above 90% for most of the sample (it is actually at its lowest value at the end of the
sample). In the 2000-2005 period, the probability is not distinguishable from one. This is
surprising: intuition would suggest that the period in which the dividend-price ratio was
21rising far above its long-run mean (and during which returns kept being high despite these
high levels) would correspond to an exceptionally low posterior probability of predictability,
not a high one. Indeed, it is surprising that data could ever lead the investor to a nearly
100% certainty about the predictability model.
Panel B, which shows the Bayes factors, gives another perspective on this result. Between
2000 and 2005, the Bayes factor in favor of predictability rises to values that dwarf any others
during the sample. The posterior probability takes these Bayes factors and maps them to
the [0, 1] interval, so values as high as those shown in the gure are translated to posterior
probabilities extremely close to 1. Why is it that the Bayes factors rise so high?
An answer is suggested by the time series behavior of  and , shown in Figure 5. The
solid lines show the posterior distributions of  and .8 The dashed line shows OLS estimates.
The posterior for  lies below the OLS estimate for most of the period, while the posterior
for  lies above the OLS estimator for most of the period. An exception occurs in 2001, when
the positions reverse. The posterior for  lies above the OLS estimate and the posterior for
 lies below it. Note that the OLS estimate of  is biased upwards and the OLS estimate of
 is biased downwards, so this switch is especially surprising.
The fact that the posterior  rises to meet the OLS , and even exceeds it, indicates that
the model interprets the rise of the dividend-price ratio as occurring because of an unusual
sequence of positive shocks vt. Namely, positive shocks are more likely to occur after positive
shocks during this period. This implies that negative shocks to ut are also more likely to
follow positive shocks vt than they should, so OLS will in fact underestimate the true  (or
it will overestimate the true  by less than usual).
This result is similar in spirit to that found in the frequentist analysis of Lewellen (2004)
and Campbell and Yogo (2006) (see also the discussion in the survey article Campbell (2008)).
8For the argument below, it makes the most sense, strictly speaking, to examine the posterior distribution
of  conditional on the predictability model. However, because the posterior probability of this model is so
close to one, this conditional posterior  is nearly indistinguishable from the unconditional posterior . The
same is true for posterior . Therefore, for simplicity, we focus on the unconditional posterior.
22It is also an example of how information about shocks that are correlated with errors from a
forecasting model can help improve forecasts, as in Faust and Wright (2011). Figure 4 shows
that the consequences of this result for model selection are quite large. This is because the
no-predictability model implies, of course, that  is zero. However, given that OLS nds
a positive , the no-predictability model implies that positive shocks to the dividend-price
ratio were follows by positive shocks to returns. This is extremely unlikely, given the time
series. Thus the evidence comes to strongly favor the predictability model.9
This chain of inference requires knowledge of the behavior of shocks to the predictor
variable. The xed-regressor approach described above eliminates such knowledge and leads
to completely dierent inference over this time period. To illustrate this result, we compute
the posterior probability of return predictability (by the dividend-price ratio), and the Bayes
factor, using the prior-likelihood combination of Cremers (2002).10 Very similar results are
obtained for the methods in Avramov (2002). The probability of predictability computed us-
ing the xed-regressor approach indeed shows a decline over the 2000-2005 period, stemming
from the decline in the OLS estimate of .
Finally, to demonstrate the impact of these prior beliefs on portfolio choice, we compute
the optimal weight in the risky asset for the power utility investor described in Section 3.4.
We consider four specications of the prior. Panel A assumes that P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:05,
so that predictability, if it exists, is weak. Posteriors are computed for q = 0:01 and q = 0:99.
Panel B repeats this exercise for P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:50. Both panels show that the
investor with a strong prior that returns are not predictable (q = :01) engages in notably less
market timing that an investor who is convinced that there is some predictability (q = :99).
Comparing Panel A with Panel B shows that the investor who believes that predictability is
very weak (assuming it exists) times the market much less than an investor with a somewhat
9We also performed this analysis using the conditional rather than the exact likelihood. Because the
results are qualitatively the same, we do not present them here.
10We use the priors corresponding to Cremers \condent" view. Varying the choice of prior parameters
does not impact the qualitative result that we present.
23atter (though still highly informative) prior. Consider the investor with q = 0:01 and
P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:05 (the solid line in Panel A). This investor has a prior believe that
there is only a 1% chance that returns are predictable. Even if returns are predictable, he
believes the predictability must be very weak: there is only a 5% chance that the R2 from
a quarterly regression exceeds 1%. However, even this investor nds overwhelming evidence
for stock return predictability in the 2002{2005 period.
4 Conclusion
This study has taken a Bayesian approach to the question of whether the equity premium
varies over time. We considered investors who face uncertainty both over whether pre-
dictability exists, and over the strength of predictability if it does exist. We found substantial
evidence in favor of predictability when the dividend-price ratio is used to predict returns.
Moreover, we found large certainty equivalent losses from failing to time the market, even
for investors who have strong prior beliefs in a constant equity premium.
When we examined the time series of the investor's beliefs, we found that the belief in
return predictability goes to one in the 2000-2005 period, even for investors who place a
very low prior on return predictability. This surprising result is a consequence of correctly
modeling the regressor as stochastic rather than xed. We also found that our posterior
mean return is notably dierent from the sample average, a result that again stems from
taking the stochastic nature of the regressor into account. These results demonstrate that
the way that the regressor is modeled is very important. We hope to examine this issue
further in future work.
24Appendix
A Jereys prior under H0
Our derivation for the limiting Jereys prior on b0; generalizes that of Stambaugh (1999).
Zellner (1996, pp. 216-220) derives a limiting Jereys prior by applying (A.1) to the likelihood
(17) and retaining terms of the highest order in T. Stambaugh shows that Zellner's approach
is equivalent to applying (A.1) to the conditional likelihood (16), and taking the expectation
in (A.1) assuming that x0 is multivariate normal with mean (6) and variance (7). We adopt
this approach.












We derive the prior density for p(b0; 1) and then transform this into the density for p(b0;)
using the Jacobian. Let
l0(b0;;D) = logp(Djb0;;H0;x0): (A.2)
denote the natural log of the conditional likelihood. Let  = [(11) (12) (22)]>, where (ij)
denotes element (i;j) of  1. Applying (A.1) implies
p(b0;
 1jH0) /


































(z   Z0b0): (A.4)
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because 2 columns and 2 rows have
been reversed.

































































































B Sampling from Posterior Distributions
This section describes how to sample from the posterior distributions. In all cases, the
sampling procedure for the posteriors under H1 and H0 involve the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. Below we describe the case of the exact likelihood in detail. The procedure for
the conditional likelihood is similar.
B.1 Posterior distribution under H0























27This posterior does not take the form of a standard density function because of the term in
the likelihood involving x0 (note that 2
x is a nonlinear function of  and v). However, we
can sample from the posterior using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is implemented \block-at-a-time", by repeatedly sam-
pling from p(jb0;H0;D) and from p(b0j;H0D) and repeating. To calculate a proposal





















The proposal density for the conditional probability of  is the inverted Wishart with T +2
degrees of freedom and scale factor of (Y   XB0)>(Y   XB0). The target is therefore









































(z   Z0b0) = (b0  ^ b0)
>V
 1
0 (b0  ^ b0) + terms independent of b0.
The proposal density for b0 is therefore multivariate normal with mean ^ b0 and variance-
covariance matrix V0. The accept-reject algorithm of Chib and Greenberg (1995, Section 5)












Note that u and  are in the constant of proportionality. Drawing successively from the
conditional posteriors for  and b0 produces a density that converges to the full posterior
conditional on H0.
28B.2 Posterior distribution under H1







































The sampling procedure is similar to that described in Appendix B.1. Details can be found
in Wachter and Warusawitharana (2009). To summarize, we rst draw from the posterior
p(jb1;H1;D). The proposal density is an inverted Wishart with T + 2 degrees of freedom








We then draw from p(;j;;;H1;D). The proposal density is multivariate normal with
mean and variance determined by the conditional normal distribution. Finally, we draw from
p(; j;;;H1;D). In this case, the target and the proposal are the same, and are also
multivariate normal.
C Computing the Bayes factor
Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995) provide an implementable formula for the inverse of the
Bayes factor. In our notation, this formula can be written as
B
 1





   = 0;H1;D

: (C.1)
To compute p( = 0jH1;D), note that
p( = 0jH1;D) =
Z
p( = 0jb0;;H1;D)p(b0;jH1;D)db0 d: (C.2)
As discussed in Appendix B.2, the posterior distribution of  and  conditional on the
remaining parameters is normal. We can therefore compute p( = 0jb0;;H1;D) (including
29integration constants) in closed form, by using the properties of the conditional normal





we can write (b
(i)
1 ;(i)) as ((i);b
(i)
0 ;(i)). We use these draws to integrate out over b0 and
. It follows from (C.2) that









where the approximation is accurate for large N.









because p(b0;jH0) = p(b0;jH1). Note that  =  1
x u. We require the expectation
taken with respect to the posterior distribution conditional on the existence of predictability





from p(b0;j = 0;H1;D). This involves modifying the procedure for drawing from the pos-
terior for b1; given H1 (see Appendix B.2). We sample from p(j; = 0;;;H1;D),
then from p(;j; = 0;;H1;D) and nally from p(j = 0;;;;H1;D), and re-
peat until the desired number of draws are obtained. All steps except the last are identical
to those described in Appendix B.2 (the value of  is identically zero rather than the value
from the previous draw). For the last step we derive p(j = 0;;;;H1;D) from the joint
distribution p(; j;;;H1;D), making use of the properties of the conditional normal
distribution.




















where this approximation is accurate for N large.
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34Table 1: Bayes factors and conditional posterior means
Posterior Means
P(R2 > 0:01jH1) Bayes factor   r x
Panel A: Exact likelihood
0 Undened 0 0.997 3.45 -3.25
0.05 4.13 1.07 0.989 3.77 -3.35
0.25 6.48 1.65 0.985 3.85 -3.38
0.50 6.13 1.91 0.983 3.88 -3.39
0.99 0.01 2.06 0.982 3.90 -3.40
Panel B: Conditional likelihood
0 Undened 0 0.998 4.48 -6.83
0.05 2.00 0.74 0.993 3.70 -5.28
0.25 2.71 1.36 0.988 3.39 -4.79
0.50 2.56 1.66 0.985 3.11 -4.78
0.99 0.01 1.80 0.984 2.15 -5.03
Panel C: Ordinary least squares
2.97 0.973 4.49 -3.54
Notes: The Bayes factor equals the probability of the data D given the predictability
model H1 divided by the probability of the data given the no-predictability model H0:
p(DjH1)=p(DjH0). Bayes factors are reported for various priors of the strength of pre-
dictability under H1, indexed by P(R2 > 0:01jH1) (namely, the prior probability that the
population R2 exceeds 0.01, assuming H1). Posterior means are conditional on H1 and are
computed for the predictability coecient , the persistence of the dividend-price ratio ,
the mean of the continuously compounded excess return r, and the mean of the predic-
tor variable x. In Panel C, r and x equal the sample means. Data are quarterly from
7/1/1952 to 3/31/2009.
35Table 2: Posterior probability of predictability, unconditional posterior means of  and R2,
and certainty equivalent returns.
P(R2 > 0:01jH1) Prior probability of return predictability q
0.20 0.50 0.80 0.99
Panel A: Posterior probability of predictability  q
0.05 0.51 0.80 0.94 1.00
0.25 0.62 0.87 0.96 1.00
0.50 0.61 0.86 0.96 1.00
0.99 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.54
Panel B: Posterior mean of predictive coecient 
0.05 0.55 0.86 1.01 1.07
0.25 1.02 1.43 1.59 1.65
0.50 1.16 1.64 1.84 1.91
0.99 0.01 0.02 0.09 1.12
Panel C: Posterior mean of R2 (in percentages)
0.05 0.30 0.48 0.56 0.59
0.25 0.59 0.83 0.92 0.95
0.50 0.68 0.97 1.08 1.12
0.99 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.68
Panel D: Dierence in CER between optimal and no-predictability strategies
0.05 0.38 0.84 1.10 1.20
0.25 0.85 1.45 1.71 1.81
0.50 1.00 1.72 2.03 2.15
0.99 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.67
Notes: The table reports statistics of the posterior distribution, averaging over the models
H1 and H0. The parameter q denotes the prior probability of H1. Statistics are reported
for various priors of the strength of predictability under H1, indexed by P(R2 > 0:01jH1)
(namely, the prior probability that the population R2 exceeds 0.01, assuming H1). CER
stands for certainty equivalent return and is annualized by multiplying by four. Data are
quarterly from 7/1/1952 to 3/31/2009.
36Figure 1: Prior Distribution of the R2
Panel A: Probability of predictability q = 1.


























Panel B: Probability of predictability q = 0:5.


























Notes: The gures plot the prior probability that the R2 will be greater than some value
k for dierent values of k. This equals 1 minus the cumulative density function for the
distribution on the R2. Panel A reports the values conditional on predictability (q = 1) and
panel B plots the values for a prior value of q = 0:5.  parameterizes the prior variance of
 with  =  1
x u.
37Figure 2: Posterior Distribution of the R2
Panel A Panel B





















































Notes: Panel A plots the probability that the R2 from a predictive regression of excess stock
returns on the payout yield will be greater than some value k for dierent values of k. This
equals 1 minus the cumulative density function for the distribution on the R2. Panel B plots
the probability density function of the R2 for the same regression. The dashed line signies
the prior and the solid line signies the posterior distribution for the R2. The likelihood
function for these plots is the full Bayes exact likelihood with P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:50 and
q = 0:5. Data are quarterly from 7/1/1952 to 3/31/2009.
38Figure 3: The log dividend-price ratio












Notes: The quarterly observations on the log of the dividend-price ratio, computed by di-
viding the dividend payout over the previous 12 months by the current price. Prices and
dividends are for the CRSP value-weighted index.
39Figure 4: The Bayes factor and posterior probability of return predictability
Panel A: Posterior probability of predictability,  q













Panel B: Log Bayes factor












Notes: Panel A shows the posterior probability of H1 (the predictability model), assuming
a prior probability of 0.5. Panel B shows the Bayes factor, equal to the probability of the
data given the predictability model H1 divided by the probability of the data given the no-
predictability model H0. Both panels assume P(R2 > 0:01jH1) (namely, the prior probability
that the population R2 exceeds 0.01, given H1) is equal to 0.5. The Bayes factor and the
posterior probability are computed using quarterly data beginning in 7/1/1952 and ending
at the time shown on the x-axis. The solid line shows results for the main specication; the
dotted line shows results for a model assuming a non-stochastic regressor. 40Figure 5: Posterior means of  and  over time.
Panel A: Posterior mean of predictive coecient 













Panel B: Posterior mean of autoregressive coecient 









Notes: Panels show means of posterior distributions and ordinary least squares estimates.
The posterior distributions are computed assuming q (the priori probability that returns are
predictable) equal to 0.50, and assuming P(R2 > 0:01jH1) (the prior probability that the
population R2 exceeds 0.01, given H1) also equal to 0.5. The posterior distributions and OLS
estimates are computing using data beginning in 7/1/1952 and ending at the time shown on
the x-axis.
41Panel A: Portfolio weights with P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:05











Panel B: Portfolio weights with P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:50









Notes: Panels show the time series of weights in the risky asset assuming prior distribution
such that P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:05 (Panel A) and such that P(R2 > 0:01jH1) = 0:50 (Panel
B). The solid lines assume the prior probability of predictability q equals 0.01; the dashed
lines assume q = 0:99. The investor has power utility with risk aversion equal to 5. The
posterior distributions are computing using data beginning in 7/1/1952 and ending at the
time shown on the x-axis.
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